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This  paper  analyzes  teachers’  behavior  in  Brazilian  public  schools  after  the 
introduction of the Fundef in 1998. The model predicts that: (i) teachers engaged in 
gaming, by adjusting the fail and repetition rates to affect the number of students and, 
consequently, their wages; (ii) the degree of this opportunistic behavior decreases with 
the number of schools in a municipality due to the free-rider problem. The empirical 
investigation corroborates these predictions. In particular, the change in the repetition 
rate after the Fundef ranged from -12% (1st grade) to +38% (8th grade). Finally, there 
was a fall in students’ proficiency that could be associated with a fall in the educational 
standard. 
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1) Introduction 
In 1998, the Brazilian Congress approved an educational funding program called 
Fundef  (Fundo  de  Manutenção  e  Desenvolvimento  do  Ensino  Fundamental  e  de 
Valorização  do  Magistério).  It  has  been  in  place  since  its  implementation  in  1999. 
Among others, it has the following main characteristics
1. First, it stipulates that each 
Brazilian State forms a fund that incorporates 15% of all tax revenues
2. These resources 
have to be invested in primary and secondary educations. Each municipality (or the state 
government) receives a fraction of this fund based on the number of students enrolled in 
its schools. Finally, 60% of these resources have to be directed to pay teachers’ wages. 
Hence, the Fundef indirectly linked teachers’ wages to the number of students 
registered in the schools. Therefore, it may have given the teachers incentives to take 
actions  in  order  to  influence  their  school’s  enrollment.  This  paper’s  objective  is 
precisely to develop both a theoretic and an empirical analysis to assess this possibility.  
Initially, we build a model in order to predict teachers’ behavior before and after 
the introduction of Fundef. We find that, after the Fundef, they are likely to engage in 
opportunistic behavior or gaming, by adjusting the fail and repetition rates
4, in order to 
affect the number of students and, consequently, their wages. In fact, we show that there 
is an optimal fail and repetition rates that maximizes teachers’ utility. On the one hand, 
teachers have incentives to increase the fail and repetition rates in order to maintain a 
                                                 
1 See Semeghini (2001) and Souza (2005) for more details on the Fundef program. 
2 These taxes are state and municipal taxes. Brazil is a federation formed by 27 states 
plus the Federal District. Each state is divided into municipalities. In each state, both 
state and municipal schools coexist. Each jurisdiction has its own wages’s policy but 
since 1999 they have to follow the outlines defined in the Fundef. 
4 The repetition rate is the fraction of students who fail the grade and decide to repeat it.    3 
student  for  a  longer  period  in  the  school.    On  the  other  hand,  this  strategy  has  its 
limitations as a student who considers that his probability of failing a grade is high, may 
end up abandoning the school, which reduces the number of students, i.e., there is a 
connection between the fail and the dropout rates
5. Combining these two effects, we 
predict that teachers’ optimal strategy is to impose a relatively lower fail and repetition 
rates in the initial grades and a relatively higher ones in the final grades.   
Moreover,  we  show  that  this  opportunistic  behavior  may  vary  in  intensity 
depending on the number of schools (or students) in a given location or municipality. 
The reason is the following. When there are many schools (and students), teachers’ 
behavior in one school has a negligible effect on the amount of resources directed to this 
location,  and  consequently  to  their  wages.  This  is  the  classical  free-rider  problem
6. 
Hence, our model predicts that this opportunistic behavior is more likely to occur the 
lower is the number of schools (or students) in one location, say, a municipality. 
Next,  we  perform  an  empirical  investigation  to  check  some  theoretical 
predictions. We employ the Difference-in-Difference method, first described in Card 
(1990) and analyzed in Angrist and Krueger (1999). The control and treated groups are, 
respectively,  the  private  and  public  schools.  The  results  seem  to  corroborate  the 
predictions of the model. In comparison with the control group, the repetition rate is 
lower in the initial grades (1
st to 4
th grades) and higher in the last grades (5
th to 8
th 
grades).  The  magnitude  of  the  effect  varies  from  grade  to  grade,  and  it  increases 
monotonically  from  the  first  to  the  last  grade  of  the  fundamental  education.  In 
proportion to the repetition rate in 1997 (the year before the Fundef), the Fundef’s effect 
ranges from a drop of -11.65% in the first grade to a rise of 37.95% in the eighth grade. 
                                                 
5 Ribeiro (1992) analyses and discusses the relationship between the fail and the dropout 
rate. 
6 The classic reference on this issue is Olson (1965).   4 
The free-rider effect, however, is not very strong. But we still find that, due to 
the  Fundef’s  effect,  in  municipalities  with  relatively  small  number  of  schools,  the 
repetition rate is relatively lower and greater in public schools, respectively, in the first 
and the last four grades. 
Finally,  we  investigate  the  more  likely  mechanism  employed  by  teachers  to 
affect  the  repetition  rate.  One  possible  mechanism  is  the  following.  Given  the 
educational standard, an improvement in the quality of the education can reduce the 
repetition rate. Alternatively, given the quality of the education, the reduction in the 
standard can also reduce the repetition rate.  
The  empirical  evidence  suggests  that  there  was  a  drop  in  the  students’ 
proficiency in mathematics. It occurred both in the fourth grade (four years after the 
introduction on the Fundef) and in the eighth grade (eight years after the introduction of 
the Fundef). Hence, there was no indication of an improvement in the quality of the 
education due to the Fundef. As an alternative explanation for a fall in the students’ 
performance, one can not discard the possibility that teachers reduce the educational 
standard in order to adjust the repetition rate. 
This paper is related to the literature that investigates how teachers react to the 
incentives of a new educational policy. In particular, there are many studies analyzing 
how teachers respond to the implementation of a policy adopted in many states in the 
US  in  which  they  receive  bonuses  or  sanctions  based  on  the  performance  of  their 
students on standardized tests. These studies evaluate if teachers either increase the fail 
and dropout rates or send more students to special education placement to avoid the 
relatively bad students to take the test and then reduce their students’ average grades. 
Some examples are: Jacob (2004) in Chicago, Koretz and Barron (1998) in Kentucky, 
Haney (2000), Carnoy et. al (2001) and Toenjes and Dworkin (2002) in Texas, Figlio   5 
and Getzler (2002) in Florida and Carnoy and Loeb (2002) and Hanushek and Raymond 
(2004) in the US.  
The novelty in our paper is to investigate opportunistic behavior by teachers due 
to the introduction of Fundef in a context in which there is also a free-rider problem. To 
our knowledge, there is only one paper that analyzes the effects of Fundef by Menezes-
Filho and Pazello (2004). Although they estimate its effects on the wages of the teachers 
in the public schools and the proficiency of the public school students, they do not deal 
with these incentive issues.  
This paper is divided into six sections, including this introduction. Section 2 
develops the basic choice model for the before-Fundef case. Section 3 extends the basic 
model in order to assess the new incentives induced by Fundef, and derives the basic 
predictions  of  the  model.  Sections  4  and  5  present  the  empirical  strategy  and  the 
database to analyze the effects of the Fundef, respectively, on the repetition rate and the 
students’ proficiency level. The last section concludes. 
 
2) The Basic Model Before the Fundef 
This section builds a basic model in order to predict teacher’s behavior before 
the introduction of Fundef.  
There are N equal schools/teachers in location J. For our purposes, it is sufficient 
to analyze the problem of a representative teacher/school in location J. Representative 
teacher j’s objective is to maximize his utility function, which depends on his wage 
( )
j W   and  leisure  time( )
j L
7.  Under  the  policy  before  the  introduction  of  Fundef, 
teacher’s wage was basically a function of his tenure and his highest academic degree. 
                                                 
7 Throughout the analysis, we use “teacher” and “school” interchangeably. “Teacher” 
represents  the  group  of  teachers  and  directors  in  the  school.  The  idea  is  that  this 
“teacher” decides the amount of effort and its allocation in different activities of all 
school personnel.   6 
In  contrast  with  the  Fundef,  the  number  of  students  enrolled  in  the  school  did  not 
influence teacher’s wage. In fact, teacher’s behavior or performance in the classroom 
did not affect his wage. Therefore, we assume that teacher’s wage is fixed and is equal 
to W in all schools. 
School j offers two grades. In the beginning of the period, there are enrolled  N  
new students in the school in the first grade. Teacher j can work to influence the number 
of students enrolled in his school in the end of the period by adjusting the fail rate. In 
order  to  decrease  the  fail  rate,  teacher  can,  for  example,  decrease  the  requirements 
necessary for a student to pass the grade or increase the quality of the education, which 
make more students able to pass a given standard.  
Independently of his choice, we assume that a teacher needs to make an effort to 
adjust the fail rate. Effort, however, is costly as it reduces his leisure time. Let 
j
g E  be 
the amount of effort devoted by teacher  j  to affect the number of students in grade  g  
( 1,2 = g ) and  g f be the fail rate in grade g (g=1,2). The fail rate function when teacher 
dedicates effort 
j




g g E h f E f δ δ + = ; . The parameter δ may take one 
of the two values δ=1 or δ=-1, according to the teacher’s goal. If the teacher makes the 
effort 
j
g E  in order to increase the fail rate, then δ=1. Conversely, if he makes the effort 
in order to decrease the fail rate, then δ=-1.  The function h is nonnegative, strictly 
increasing, strictly concave, with h(0)=0. Moreover, we assume the following feasibility 
conditions
9: 0≤ f ≤1 and  ( ) { } f f h − ≤ 1 , min 1 . 
It  is  noteworthy  that ( ) f f g = 0 ; δ ,  i.e.,  f   is  the  fail  rate  when  the  teacher 
dedicates no effort to affect the fail rate. Therefore, we call  f  the “natural” fail rate. 
                                                 
9 These conditions ensure that  ( ) 1 ; 0 ≤ ≤
j
g E f δ  for every effort choice.   7 
Note, moreover, that the expression for f incorporates the simplifying assumption that 
the effect of effort on increasing or decreasing the fail rate is symmetric, which clearly 
needs not be the case. A more general form makes calculations more confusing without 
adding any insights.  
The teacher’s goal is to choose the optimal amount of effort. Then teacher  j  





j E j E
L W U ; max
; 2 1 ; δ
, 
where:W is given;  } 1 , 1 {− ∈ δ ;  1 , 0 2 1 ≤ ≤
j j E E ; 1 2 1 ≤ +
j j E E ;  1 = 2 1
j j j L E E + + .
10 
The model assumes that U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously 
differentiable  function  with  strictly  positive  cross  partials: 0 > = 21 12 U U .  This  last 
assumption simply states that the higher your wage, the more you are able to enjoy an 
extra unit of leisure time, and the more leisure time you have the more you are able to 
enjoy and extra unit of wage. Note that the model normalizes leisure time to be in the 
interval [0,1]. 
Note that, since the teacher’s wage W  is fixed, the only effect of effort in the 
objective function is to reduce leisure time. Therefore, the problem has a trivial corner 
solution: 0 2 1 = =
j j E E . Any choice for δ is optimal and ineffective, since the teacher 
chooses to exert no effort to manipulate the fail rate. The resulting equilibrium fail rate 
is the natural rate f .  
Note that the solution to the teacher’s problem does not depend on the symmetry 
hypothesis  about  the  effect  of  effort  on  the  fail  rate.  That  hypothesis  will  simplify 
                                                 
10 For simplicity, we assume that a teacher can use his time either to affect the fail rate 
or to leisure.     8 
calculations in the next section, where the new incentives brought about by the Fundef 
program is modeled. 
 
3) The Fundef’s New Incentives 
As discussed in the previous section, before the introduction of Fundef in 1999, 
teacher’s behavior in the classroom did not affect his wages. In contrast, the Fundef 
added a new feature in the teacher’s wage’s policy.  
First, it established that the amount of resources directed to each location is a 
function of the number of students enrolled in the schools in this location. Moreover, 
60% of all of these resources had necessarily to be directed to pay teacher’s wage. 
Therefore, as the Fundef indirectly linked teacher’s wage to the number of students 
registered in his school, it created an incentive for teachers to affect this number. We 
then modify the model in the previous section in order to incorporate this new feature in 
the teacher’s problem. 
Teacher j’s wage  ( )
j W  is now a function of the number of students enrolled in 
the  schools  in  location  J.  Then,  we  can  write  the  following  wage  function 










j j j j S E E S R W 2 1 , =   where:  R  is  assumed  to  be  a  twice  continuously 
differentiable and strictly  concave function; ( )
j j j E E S 2 1 ,  is the number of students in 





 is the number 






 is a given number for teacher j, as he can not affect the number 
of students enrolled in other schools in the same location
11. Moreover, we can write 
as: ( ) ( ) ( )
j j j j j j E E s E s E E S 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 , = , + , where sg refers to enrollment in grade g=1,2.  
In addition to the notation defined before, let  g r and  g d  be, respectively, the 
repetition and dropout rates in grade g
13. Then, obviously,  g g g d r f + = . All these three 
variables are a function of the efforts employed by teacher j in their respective grades. 
Note that 0≤ ( )
j
g g E f ,  ( )
j
g g E r ,  ( ) 1 ≤
j
g g E d . 
At  the  end  of  the  period,  we  have  the  following  situation.  The  number  of 
students enrolled in grade  1 = g  is equal to ( )=
j E s 1 1 ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j E r N E r N N 1 1 1 1 1+ = + , that is, 
the new students who join the school  ( ) N  plus the students who fail the first grade and 
decide to repeat it. The number of students enrolled in grade  2 = g  equals ( )=
j j E E s 2 1 2 ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j j j j j E r E d E r N E r N E d E r N 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 + − − = + − − .  The  first  term 
corresponds  to  the  students  admitted  into  second  grade  and  the  second  term  is  the 
students who fail the second grade and decide to repeat it. 
We  make  two  additional  simplifying  assumptions.  The  first  one  is  that  the 
repetition rate is a fixed proportion, λ, of the fail rate. Therefore, the dropout rate is also 
a fixed proportion, (1-λ), of the fail rate, i.e., a fixed fraction  ( ) λ − 1  of those students 




g g E f E r λ =  and 




g g E f E d λ − 1 = .  This  assumption  tries  to  capture  the  empirical  evidence  in 
which the higher is the fail rate, the greater is the dropout rate
14. 
                                                 
11 Parents enroll their children in the public school closer to their home. 
13 These are the rates in school j. The superscript is omitted for simplicity. 
14 See Ribeiro (2000) for empirical evidence supporting that hypothesis.   10 
Using the above assumption, we can define a natural repetition rate (r ). It is the 
one that prevails when teacher’s effort is zero and the fail rate is equal to the natural 
one. Formally, we have: r = f λ . 
 Also  using  the  above  assumption,  the  total  enrollment  in  school  j  can  be 
rewritten in the following way: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
j j j j j j E E s E s E E S 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 , = , +  
( ) [ ]
j E f N 1 1 1 λ + = + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j j E f E f E f N 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 λ λ λ + − − −  
= ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j E f E f N 2 2 1 1 1 2 λ λ + − −  
The  second  assumption  is  that  the  function  that  measures  the  effect  of  the 




g E k E h = , 
where α∈[0,1] and k  { } f f − ,1 max <  is a nonnegative parameter
15. Note that under this 








g g E k f + . 
Thus, total school enrollment becomes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
j j j j j j E E s E s E E S 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 , = , + ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
α α
δ λ δ λ
j j E k f E k f N 2 2 1 1 1 2 + + + − − =  
The teacher’s objective is, again, to choose the optimal amount of effort. Given 
the new incentives introduced by Fundef, teacher  j  solves the following problem: 





















E E S E k f E k f N R U
j j 2 1 2 2 1 1
; ; ;
1 ; 1 2 max
2 1 2 1
α α
δ δ
δ λ δ λ  
Note that, as  1 < < 0 λ , the optimum fail rate differs across grades. Indeed, the 
term  ( ) ( ) ( )
α
δ λ
j E k f 1 1 1 1 + − −  in the above objective function is related to the number of 
                                                 
15 This functional form leads to a closed-form solution. In addition, the restriction on k 
ensures that  ( ) 1 ; 0 ≤ ≤
j
g g E f δ  for every effort choice for the present specification of the 
fail rate. 
   11 
students in the end of the period that is influenced by the effort in the first grade. Note 
that  the  coefficient  of  the  fail  rate  in  that  term  is  negative.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
maximize the objective function, teacher  j  is better off choosing 1 = 1 − δ , as R and U 
are both strictly increasing in their respective arguments. The converse occurs in the 
second grade, since the term  ( ) ( )
α
δ λ
j E k f 2 2 2 +  has a positive coefficient; therefore, his 
optimal  choice  is 1 = 2 δ .  This  remark  already  highlights  an  asymmetry  that  was  not 
present in the original model, which is caused by the Fundef program. 
Plugging in the optimal choices for δ1 and δ2, teacher j's problem in the presence 
of Fundef becomes: 





















E E S E k f E k f N R U
j j 2 1 2 1
;
1 ; 1 2 max
2 1
α α
λ λ  
The  propositions  below  characterize  the  teacher’s  optimal  effort  choice  in 
presence of Fundef. All proofs are presented in the Appendix 1. 
Proposition 1: Let 
∗ ∗
2 1 ,E E  be the solution to the teacher’s problem in the presence of 
Fundef. Then 















. Moreover, since U is a strictly increasing function, 
0 > 1
∗ E  and  0 > 2
∗ E . 
Proposition 1 indicates that teacher j makes effort to influence the fail rate, and 
consequently the repetition and dropout rates, in both grades. In other words, according 
to  the  theoretical  prediction,  the  Fundef  gives  incentives  for  teachers  to  engage  in 
opportunistic  behavior,  through  gaming,  in  order  to  affect  their  wages.  The  way  of 
doing this is by affecting the fail rate and, consequently, the number of students enrolled 
in their schools, which ultimately determines their wages.    12 
Note that, since δ1=-1 whereas δ2=1, the effort in the first period is aimed at 
decreasing the fail rate (and consequently the repetition rate), whereas the effort in the 
second period is aimed at increasing the fail rate (and consequently the repetition rate). 
Therefore, Corollary 2 comes as a direct consequence of the above proposition
16. It 
states that, in comparison with the natural rate, the optimum fail (repetition) rate is 
lower in the first grade and it is higher in the second grade. The intuition is simple. To 
avoid students to dropout in the first grade and lose students in the second grade, the 
teacher reduces the fail rate (and consequently the repetition rate) in the first grade 
relatively to the natural rate. In the second grade, the only way to retain part of the 
students is by increasing the fail rate (and consequently the repetition rate) as they leave 
school if they pass the grade. 
Corollary 2: The optimum fail (repetition) rate in the first grade, 
∗
1 f  (
∗
1 r ) is lower than 
the natural rate  f  (r ). Conversely, the optimal fail (repetition) rate in the second grade 
∗
2 f  (
∗
2 r ) is greater than the natural one. Therefore, 
∗ ∗ < < 2 1 f f f  and 
∗ ∗ < < 2 1 r r r . 
The result in the next corollary is also a straightforward one. The assumption 
made previously that a fixed fraction ( ) λ − 1  of those students who fail a grade decides 
to  abandon  school,  together  with  the  result  in  Corollary  2,  lead  to  the  obvious 
conclusion that the dropout rate in the second grade is greater than the one in the first 
grade. 
Corollary 3: The optimal dropout rate in the second grade  ( )
∗
2 d  is greater than the 
optimal one in the first grade ( )
∗
1 d . 
                                                 
16 The proofs of the Corollaries are straightforward and therefore they are omitted here. They are 
available upon request to the authors.   13 
The previous results indicate that gaming may be a problem (or a side-effect) 
caused by the introduction of the Fundef. We now analyze a second possible effect 
related to the Fundef, that is, the free-rider effect.  
We saw above that it is in the teacher’s interest to adjust the fail rate in order to 
affect the number of students enrolled in his school, which ultimately affects his wages.  
However, this effect may be mitigated if the number of schools (and students) in the 
location is too big. The reason is that when this number is big, teacher’s behavior in one 
school  has  a  negligible  effect  on  the  amount  of  resources  directed  to  his  school’s 
location,  and  consequently  to  his  wage.  This  is  the  classical  free-rider  problem. 
Therefore,  the  opportunistic  behavior  through  gaming  is  less  likely  to  occur  in  one 
location the greater is the number of schools (and students) there.   
In fact, the following proposition shows that, indeed, teacher j exerts a lower 
effort the greater is the number of students enrolled in location J. 
Proposition  4:    The  greater  is  the  number  of  students  in  other  schools  in  the 
municipality or state  j ,  
i
j i S ∑ ≠ , the lower is the optimum effort teacher j exerts in 
each grade, 
∗ ∗












Proposition  4 states that the less important the free-rider effect, i.e., the lower 
i
j i S ∑ ≠ , the greater the effort a teacher makes in both grades to affect the fail rate (and 
consequently the repetition rate). Hence, the higher the gap between the natural fail 
(repetition)  rate  and  the  fail  (repetition)  rates  in  each  grade.  As  a  straightforward 
consequence, the less important the free rider problem, the greater the difference in the 
fail, repetition and dropout rates in grades 1 and 2. This is precisely the result in the 
following two corollaries.   14 
Corollary 5: The less important the free-rider incentive, that is, the lower is 
i
j i S ∑ ≠ , 
the greater the difference in the fail (repetition) rate in both grades. 
Corollary 6: The less important is the free-rider incentive, that is, the lower is 
i
j i S ∑ ≠ , 
the greater is the difference in the dropout rate in both grades. 
The  above  analysis  indicates  that  one  should  expect  teachers  to  engage  in 
opportunistic  behavior  after  the  introduction  of  the  Fundef.  The  theoretical  model 
makes some predictions about the effects of the Fundef that can be tested empirically. 
First, it suggests that the fail, repetition and dropout rates should fall in the first grades 
of the fundamental education – due to the gaming effect. Second, it suggests that the 
same rates should increase in the last grades of the fundamental education – also due to 
the gaming effect. Finally, it suggests that these two previous effects should be less 
important in locations with many schools (and students) – due to the free-rider effect. 
The theoretical work assumes a proportional relation between the repetition, the 
fail and the dropout rates; therefore, anyone of those three rates could be used in our 
empirical analysis. In the next section, we use the available repetition rate to test the 
theoretical implications of the model. 
 
4)  Empirical Analysis: Repetition Rate 
4.1) Empirical Strategy and Database 
We employ the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method
17 to test the impacts of the 
Fundef on the students’ repetition rates. The treatment group is formed by the public 
schools that suffer the impact of Fundef. The control group is formed by the private 
schools, which are not influenced by the new policy.  
                                                 
17 See Card (1990) and Angrist and Krueger (1998) for the details of the method.   15 
The basic model is the following: 
it it pub t pub t it X d d d d y ε β δ β β α + + + + + = 3 1 2 1 ) ( ,    (1) 
where: the dependent variable, it y , is the repetition rate in school  i, year  t;   t d  is a 
dummy variable which is equal to one after the introduction of the Fundef and zero 
otherwise;  pub d  is a dummy equal to one if the school i is a public school and zero if it 
is a private school;  it X  is a vector of exogenous control variables;  it ε  is the error term; 
and α ,  i β  ( 3 , 2 , 1 = i ), and  1 δ  are the coefficients. 
       The  parameter  of  interest  is  1 δ ,  which  captures  the  effect  of  Fundef  on  the 
dependent  variable.  As  it  is  standard  when  this  method  is  used,  treatment  and 
comparison  groups  should  show  the  same  time  trend  had  the  policy  change  not 
occurred.  In  terms  of  our  model,  this  is  equivalent  to  say  that  the  unobservable 
characteristics  of  the  public  schools  vary  (before  and  after  the  introduction  of  the 
Fundef) exactly as the unobservable characteristics of the private schools. To minimize 
this particular problem, the set of control variables  it X  are introduced in the model. 
       In order to capture the existence of the free-rider effect discussed in the theoretical 
model, we alter the basic empirical model (1). We add a new explanatory variable, 
which is an interaction between the term  ) ( pub td d  and the number of schools in the 
municipality  where  school  i  is  located  ( it n ).  This  new  term  captures  the  different 
impact of Fundef across bigger and smaller municipalities. Hence, we rewrite model (1) 
in the following way
18: 
                    it it it pub t pub t pub t it X n d d d d d d y ε β δ δ β β α + + + + + + = 3 2 1 2 1 ] ) [( ) ( . (1’) 
                                                 
18 The parameters of this model are different from the ones in model (1). For simplicity, 
we keep the same notation.   16 
In this new model (1’), the parameter of interest is  ) ( 2 1 it n δ δ +  and it depends on the 
number of schools in the municipality where school “i” is located. As in model (1), the 
set of control variables  it X  are used. 
In order to carry out the estimation of equations (1) and (1’), we use data only for 
the years 1997 (before Fundef) and 1999 (after the introduction of the Fundef). Two 
data sets are used. From the Brazilian Educational Census database
19, we obtain the 
following  variables  for  each  Brazilian  school  (public  and  private):  the  dependent 
variable – the repetition rate; control variables related to the schools’ infra-structure – 
number of teachers, number of televisions and VCR, dummy variables indicating if the 
school have computer labs, sciences labs, sports court, recreation area, library, access to 
electric  energy  and  water  services,  and,  if  the  school  offers  food  for  the  enrolled 
students; control variables related to the municipality where the school is located – the 
number of public schools in each municipality, a dummy variable for the state where the 
school is located and a dummy variable indicating the school location (rural or urban); 
and a control variable related to the students – number of enrolled students who have 
previously  failed  the  grade.  This  last  variable  is  used  to  control  for  changes  in  the 
quality of the students across the years.  
From the Brazilian Bureau of Statistics (IBGE), we obtain additional variables to 
control  for  characteristics  of  the  municipalities:  the  Gini  Coefficient,  the  Human 
Development Index (HDI), the GDP and the population
20, 21.  
                                                 
19 This dataset is provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Education. 
20 Given that the Gini coefficient and the HDI are available only for 1991 and 2001, we 
use the values of these variables for 1991. Hence, these variables will be fixed in 1997 
and 1999. We expect that these variables capture the “initial socioeconomic conditions” 
of each municipality.  
21 The GDP variable is available only for 1996 and 1999.    17 
The data on repetition rate is available for each grade
22. Hence, we are able to check 
if the effects of the Fundef differ from grade to grade, as predicted by the theoretical 
model. With this objective in mind, we estimate models (1) and (1’) using OLS. First, 
we combine all grades in the same analysis and then separately for each one of the eight 
grades that form the fundamental education.   
 To perform the estimations, some adjustments in the database are necessary. First, 
some schools in the sample are classified as “Paralyzed” or “Extinguished”, which, 
according  to  the  Census  Dictionary,  means  that  the  activities  in  these  schools  are 
temporarily or definitely suspended. Second, some schools are not in the database in 
both years (1997 and 1999) which can be due either to sampling error or the creation of 
new  school  units  in  1999  (or  both).  Therefore,  we  exclude  from  the  sample  the 
“Paralyzed” and “Extinguished” schools and, to balance the panel, the schools which 
are not in the database in both years 1997 and 1999.
23 The total number of observations 
is equal to 318,206. 
4.2) Empirical Results 
Initially, we show in Table 1 (all empirical results are in appendix 2) the “raw” 
results  (difference  of  means)  and  make  simple  comparisons  between  the  average 
repetition rates in public and private schools, before (in the year 1997) and after (in 
1999) the introduction of Fundef.  
The numbers suggest the following. First, the repetition rates in public schools are 
on average substantially higher than in private schools in both years. For example, in 
1999,  the  average  repetition  rate  in  public  schools  is  15%,  well  above  the  3.6%  in 
                                                 
22 In the 90’s, there was eight grades in the Brazilian fundamental education. 
23  The  qualitative  results  are  basically  the  same  with  the  balanced  and  unbalanced 
panels. For simplicity, we only present the results obtained with the balanced data.    18 
private schools. Second, after the introduction of Fundef, the difference in the repetition 
rate between public and private schools decreased from 12.8% in 1997 to 11.4% in 
1999, as shown in the last column. The Difference-in-Difference parameter (in bold in 
the last column) is equal to -1.4%.  
Table 2 presents the same “raw” results but now separated for each of the eight 
grades of the fundamental education. It is interesting to notice that the result varies 
across grades. After the introduction of Fundef, in comparison with private schools, 
there was a reduction in the repetition rate for the lower grades – more precisely, first, 
second and third grades – and an increase almost monotonically from the fourth grade 
up to the eighth grade. In other words, the Difference-in-Difference parameter (in bold 
in Table 2) is negative for grades 1 to 3 and positive for the others. This pattern is 
illustrated with the help of Figure 1. These numbers suggest that the effects of Fundef 
may be different across grades. 
So far, our analysis did not consider any explanatory variable controlling for the 
potential (unobservable) differences in the trends of the treatment (public schools) and 
control  (private  schools)  group
24.  In  order  to  take  this  into  consideration,  we  now 
estimate  model  (1)  using  OLS  using  data  for  the  years  1999  (the  year  after  the 
introduction of Fundef) and 1997 (the year before the introduction of Fundef).  
The results are shown in Table 3. The explanatory variables are the same in all 
regressions. They are the variables explained in the previous subsection with controls 
related to the schools’ infrastructure, the students’ characteristic and the municipalities 
where the schools are located. In addition, there are three dummy variables: D1999 – 
                                                 
24  The  inclusion  of  control  variables  in  the  right-hand  side  of  model  (1)  –  and 
subsequently in model (1’) – attempts to assure that the identification hypothesis of the 
model is indeed valid. Intuitively, we expect that when controlled for characteristics of 
the school, students and region – in which the school is located – the unobservable 
differences (across the time) between public and private schools vanish.   19 
equal to one for the year 1999 and zero otherwise; Dpublic – equal to one for the public 
schools and zero otherwise; (D1999*Dpublic) – dummy variable that combines the year 
1999 and the public schools. The parameter of interest is the one related to this last 
variable. 
 The first column presents the results when the dependent variable is the average 
repetition rate of each school (taking the average repetition of all grades in the school). 
The coefficient of the variable (D1999*Dpublic), reported in the third line in Table 3, is 
negative  and  significantly  different  from  zero.  It  suggests  that,  due  to  the  Fundef’s 
effect, there was an overall decrease in the repetition rate in public schools by 0.87 
percentage points in comparison with the private schools.  
The other columns in Table 3 also present the results of the estimation of model (1) 
using OLS. The difference is that now the regressions are done separately for each of 
the eight grades of the fundamental education. Column 2 corresponds to the regression 
for the first grade up to column 9 and the regression for the eighth grade. 
There  are  interesting  results  with  respect  to  the  coefficient  of  variable 
(D1999*Dpublic).  With  the  exception  of  the  regression  for  the  second  grade,  the 
coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. It is negative for the first 
three  grades and positive to the others.  It also increases almost monotonically from 
grade 4 to 8. 
These  results  are  in  line  with  the  theoretical  results  obtained  previously  in  this 
paper. We saw that, due to the gaming effect, the theory predicted relatively lower and 
higher repetition rates, respectively, in the first and last grades. For example, in grade 1, 
the repetition rate in public schools, due to the Fundef effect, is 2.76 percentage points 
lower vis-à-vis the private schools. In grade 8, it is 1.67 percentage points higher. In   20 
other words, the empirical results seem to corroborate the predictions of the theoretical 
model with respect to the gaming effect. 
Table  3A  gives  information  about  the  order  of  magnitude  of  Fundef’s  effect. 
Column 1 replicates the coefficient of the variable (D1999*Dpublic) in the regressions 
in Table 3, on average and for each of the eight grades. Recall that this coefficient 
measures  the  impact  of  the  Fundef.  Column  2  presents  the  repetition  rate  in  public 
schools in 1997, also on average and for each grade. The last column shows the ratio of 
columns 1 and 2. 
On average, the magnitude of the Fundef’s effect corresponds to only -4.94% of the 
repetition rate in 1997 (line 1 in Table 3A). However, its importance varies significantly 
from grade to grade. It increases monotonically from the first to last grade, ranging from 
-11.65% to 37.95%. Although its impact is negligible, for example, in the second grade 
(-1.09%), it reaches a considerable magnitude and its peak in the eighth grade. In this 
last grade, the interpretation is that, due to the Fundef, there was an increase in the 
repetition rate of almost 38%! In fact, the order of magnitude of the Fundef’s impact is 
more important in the last four grades of the fundamental education.  
We now estimate model (1’) using OLS. The results are presented in Table 4. In 
comparison with Table 3, Table 4 adds one explanatory variable in the regressions, the 
interaction  variable  (D1999*Dpublic*n).  It  is  the  dummy  variable  (D1999*Dpublic) 
used in model (1) multiplied by “n”, the number of public schools in the municipality 
where the public school is located. The idea is that the parameter related to this variable 
should capture the free-rider effect discussed in the theoretical section. 
In Table 4, the first column presents the results when the dependent variable is the 
average  repetition  rate  of  each  school.  In  the  other  columns  (from  2  to  9),  the 
regressions are separated for each of the eight grades of the fundamental education.    21 
Initially, it is worth noting that the coefficients of both dummy variables of interest 
(“D1999*Dpublic*n” and “D1999*Dpublic”) are significantly different from zero at 5% 
in  all  regressions,  with  the  exception  of  the  coefficients  related  to  the  variable 
“D1999*Dpublic” in the regressions for the second and third grades
25.   
There  is  evidence  of  the  gaming  effect.  The  coefficient  of  the  variable 
“D1999*Dpublic” is significant and negative for the first grade and positive from grade 
four to eight. In other words, there is relatively a lower repetition rate in the first grade 
and higher in the last ones. This result is similar to the ones reported in Table 3 when 
the variable “D1999*Dpublic*n” was not included in the regression. 
The sign of the interaction “D1999*Dpublic*n” is always negative. It means that, 
for the average and for each grade, municipalities with more (less) schools had a lower 
(higher) repetition rate. This result is only in part in line with the theoretical results in 
this paper.  
From the theoretical section, we obtained the prediction that the free-rider effect 
would mitigate the gaming effect. In other words, the free-rider effect should increase 
the repetition rate in the first grades and decrease it in the last ones. Although we do see 
empirical  evidence  corroborating  the  latter  effect  (with  the  negative  sign  of 
“D1999*Dpublic*n” in the last grades), there is no evidence of the former (the sign of 
the “D1999*Dpublic*n” is also negative in the first grades and the theory predicted it to 
be positive). 
It  is  interesting  to  evaluate  the  free-rider  and  gaming  effects  combined.  This  is 
exactly what the parameter  ) ( 2 1 it n δ δ +  in model (1’) captures. Recall that 1 δ and 2 δ are, 
                                                 
25 They are significant at 1%.   22 
respectively,  the  parameters  associated  with  the  variables  “D1999*Dpublic”  and 
“D1999*Dpublic*n”. 
In the first grade, the combined effect of Fundef led to a reduction in the repetition 
rate, as  1 δ  and  2 δ  are negative. Note that this effect is stronger in municipalities with a 
higher  number  of  public  schools.  For  the  second  and  third  grades,  although  the 
parameter  1 δ   is  not  statistically  differently  from  zero,  the  combined  effect  is 
qualitatively the same, as  2 δ  is negative. 
For  the  other  grades,  the  combined  effect  of  Fundef  can  be  either  positive  or 
negative, depending on the number of schools in the municipality, as  1 δ  is positive and 
2 δ  is negative.  For municipalities with relatively few public schools, the combined 
Fundef effect is distributed across grades according to the following pattern: relatively 
lower and higher repetition rate, respectively, in the first and last grades.
26 Figure 2 
illustrates this pattern for a municipality where ten public schools are located, that is, 
n=10.  
The same pattern is not observed in municipalities with a large number of public 
schools.  In  those,  the  repetition  rate  is  relatively  lower  for  all  grades
27.  Figure  3 
illustrates this pattern for a municipality with a large number of public schools, n=1000. 
In conclusion, the combined effect of Fundef (free-rider and gaming effects) seems 
to corroborate the view that teachers may have adjusted the repetition rate in order to 
maximize their income. For the municipalities with relatively low number of public 
schools, the pattern empirically identified is characterized by the reduction of this rate in 
the initial grades followed by an increase of the repetition rates in the last grades of the 
                                                 
26 Formally, ) ( 2 1 it n δ δ +  is negative and positive, respectively, for the initial and last 
grades. 
27 Formally, ) ( 2 1 it n δ δ +  is negative for all grades.   23 
fundamental  education.  This  is  exactly  the  optimum  strategy  suggested  by  the 
theoretical model. Moreover, the same pattern is not observed in municipalities with 
relatively high number of public schools.  
4.3) Robustness 
Approximately  at  the  same  time  the  Fundef  was  introduced,  there  was  also  an 
important change in the educational policy in some Brazilian States. They adopted the 
social promotion policy. For example, the state of São Paulo adopted a system of two 
cycles. The first and the second encompass, respectively, the four initial and the last 
four  grades.  Accordingly  to this, students in the first, second, third, fifth, sixth and 
seventh grades pass automatically to the next grade. Students can only fail in the fourth 
and eighth grades. Other states adopt cycles with different number of grades and others 
more than two cycles. Obviously, these changes affect the actual repetition rates.  
As a consequence, the results obtained in the previous subsection could in principle 
be related to the introduction of the social promotion policy and not due to the Fundef 
effect. Therefore, it is necessary to check the robustness of the results.  
However, there is an important difficulty in separating the Fundef effect from the 
social  promotion  policy  one  on  the  repetition  rate.  The  reason  is  that  there  is  no 
information  about  which  and  when  the  schools  actually  started  adopting  the  social 
promotion policy. For instance, there are States that adopt the social promotion policy to 
only part of the schools and maintained the old system in the rest. 
In order to circumvent this lack of information problem and be able to check the 
robustness of our results, we adopt the following strategy. The Brazilian Ministry of 
Education collected information in the year of 1999 of the percentage of the schools in 
each Brazilian State that adopted the social promotion policy. Although it is not clear   24 
when this policy was implemented in the States, there is no evidence that the States that 
had adopted it had moved back to the previous policy (without social promotion) in the 
years before 1999. Based on this information, we re-estimate the same models (1) and 
(1’) using OLS, but using a sub-sample that comprises only the States in which the 
social promotion policy was not introduced in at least 80% of its schools
28.  
We expect that changes in the repetition rate in these States are then due to the 
introduction of the Fundef and can not possibly be due to the introduction of the social 
promotion policy.  
The results are qualitatively and quantitatively basically the same as in the previous 
subsection, with the unrestricted sample
29. It reinforces the conclusion obtained earlier 
that the Fundef seems to have given incentives to teachers to manage the repetition rate 
in order to maximize their income. In schools located in municipalities with relatively 
low number of public schools, the optimal pattern empirically identified is characterized 
by the reduction of this rate in the initial grades followed by an increase of the repetition 
rate in the last grades of the fundamental education. 
5)  Empirical Analysis: Proficiency Level 
5.1) Empirical Strategy and Database 
The results of the previous section that teachers seem to have received incentives to 
affect  the  repetition  rate  raise  another  important  issue.  That  is,  which  are  the 
mechanisms employed by teachers to affect this rate. There are some alternatives related 
with changes either in the educational standard or the quality of the education.  
                                                 
28 Brazil is a federation with 26 States plus the Federal District. This sub-sample is 
formed by 18 States. 
29 The results are available under request from the authors. They are not included due to 
space limitations.   25 
Given  the  educational  standard,  additional  efforts  to  improve  the  quality  of  the 
education can reduce the repetition rate. Alternatively, given the quality of education, 
the reduction in educational standard can also reduce the repetition rate. In the former 
case, one should observe an increase in the students’ proficiency level. In the latter case, 
a fall in the students’ proficiency level is more likely to occur. 
In order to evaluate these issues, we investigate the effects of the Fundef on the 
students’ proficiency level. As in the analysis of the previous section, we employ the 
Difference-in-Difference (DID) method and estimate model (1) using OLS, but we use a 
different database. 
We  use  the  data  of  the  National  Basic  Education  Evaluation  System  (SAEB), 
provided by the Brazilian Ministry of Education. The SAEB is a governmental program 
aimed at evaluating the quality of the Brazilian basic education. This program consists 
of biennial proficiency tests of Mathematics and language (Portuguese) applied to a 
sample of students enrolled in 4th and 8th grades of fundamental education and 3rd 
grade of secondary education in public and private schools.  
From the SAEB, we obtain the following variables for a sample of Brazilian schools 
for the years of interest, necessary to estimate model (1): the dependent variable – the 
math test school average; explanatory control variables related to the quality of schools’ 
infra-structure  –  dummy  variables  indicating  if  the  school  has  television  (TV), 
VCR/DVD (VCR/DVD), library (Library), access to electric energy (Electricity) and 
water services (Water); explanatory control variables related to the school location – a 
dummy variable indicating the school location (rural or urban) (Location) and the State 
in the Brazilian federation where it is located; explanatory control variables related to 
teachers’  characteristics  –  dummy  variable  indicating  teacher’s  gender  (Man)  and   26 
teacher’s education level (Education level), years of experience (Experience) and wage 
(Wage); and explanatory control variables related to students’ characteristics – dummy 
variables indicating student’s race (White) and gender (Man), if he has not failed any 
grade before (Failed), if he had already studied in private school (Previously Private 
School),  and  father’s  (Father’s  education)  and  mother’s  (Mother’s  education) 
education. These control variables are the explanatory variables ( it X ) in model (1). 
We evaluate the effects of the Fundef on the proficiency level in the fourth and 
eighth grades. Menezes-Filho and Pazello (2004) also make this evaluation using the 
same  methodology
30.  However,  in  contrast  with  their  paper,  we  introduce  a 
modification  in  the  empirical  strategy.  They  used  data  for  the  years  1997  (before 
Fundef) and 1999 and 2001 (after the introduction of the Fundef) to evaluate potential 
differences in performance of the public schools’ students vis-à-vis the private school 
ones. The problem with this time frame is that, for example, a public school student 
registered in the 8
th grade in 2001 started the fundamental education cycle no later than 
1994. Hence, he studied at least during four years in the public school (from 1994 up to 
1998 when the Fundef was introduced) that had not yet received the Fundef’s influence. 
The same type of problem occurs in the evaluation of the effects of the Fundef on the 
performance of the fourth grade students. 
To deal with this problem, we use the following strategy. In order to evaluate the 
performance of the  eighth grade students, we use data for the  years 1997 (the  year 
before the introduction of the Fundef) and 2005 (eight years after). In a similar way, in 
order to evaluate the performance of the fourth grade students, we use data for the years 
1997 (the year before the introduction of the Fundef) and 2001 (four years after).  
                                                 
30 They found no evidence that the Fundef improved the proficiency level of students in 
the eighth grade.   27 
5.2) Empirical Results 
We  now  turn  to  the  empirical  results  and  analyze  the  effects  of  Fundef  on  the 
proficiency level. Table 7 presents the results. 
In the first column, we present the results of the estimation of model (1) using OLS 
and data for the years 2001 and 1997 to check the Fundef’s effects on the proficiency 
level on the fourth grade. We use an unbalanced panel of schools. In other words, all 
schools that are in the SAEB samples in 1997 and 2001 are included, independently if 
the school is included in both samples or not.  
The dependent variable is the math test school average on the fourth grade. Besides 
the  control  variables  discussed  in  the  previous  subsection,  there  are  three  other 
explanatory variables: the dummy variable (D2001) – equal to one for the year 2001 and 
zero otherwise; the dummy variable (Dpublic) – equal to one if the school is public and 
zero otherwise; and the dummy variable (D2001*Dpublic) – the interaction of the two 
previous dummy variables.  
The  parameter  of  interest  is  the  one  related  to  the  dummy  variable 
(D2001*Dpublic). It is negative and significantly different from zero. It suggests that 
the Fundef led to a reduction in the level of Mathematics proficiency by the fourth grade 
students in public schools. This result could be interpreted as an indication that there 
was a fall in the quality of education in the first four years of the fundamental education 
after the introduction of Fundef.  
From the previous section, we obtained the result that there was a reduction in the 
repetition rate in the initial grades. It occurred simultaneously with a fall in the quality 
of education. One could interpret that these two results combined could be an indication   28 
that  there  was  a  reduction  in  the  educational  standard.  That  is,  the  requirements 
necessary for a student to pass to an advanced grade in the initial grades were reduced.  
We re-do the estimation of model (1) using OLS and data for the years 2001 and 
1997, but using the balanced panel
31. That is, we incorporate in the regression only 
schools that are included in both SAEB samples, in 1997 and 2001. The results are 
reported in the second column in Table 7. They are qualitatively equal to the results for 
the unbalanced panel. 
We now check the effects of Fundef on the proficiency level on the eighth grade. In 
Table 7, columns 3 and 4 report the results of the estimation of model (1) using OLS 
and data for the years 1997 and 2005 using, respectively, the unbalanced and balanced 
panel. 
The dependent variable is the math test school average on the eighth grade. Besides 
the  control  variables  discussed  in  the  previous  subsection
32,  there  are  three  other 
explanatory variables: the dummy variable (D2005) – equal to one for the year 2005 and 
zero otherwise; the dummy variable (Dpublic) – equal to one if the school is public and 
zero otherwise; and the dummy variable (D2005*Dpublic) – the interaction of the two 
previous dummy variables.  
The  parameter  of  interest  is  the  one  related  to  the  dummy  variable 
(D2005*Dpublic). The results are qualitatively the same in both panels (unbalanced and 
balanced). It is negative and significantly different from zero. As in the analysis of the 
                                                 
31 Note that the number of observations in the balanced panel is significantly smaller. It 
is equal to 270 in contrast with the unbalanced panel with 4994 observations.  
32 In the regressions related to the eighth grade, the control variable (Localization) is not 
included because it is not part of 2005 Saeb database. Moreover, in the balanced panel, 
the control variable (Electricity) is also not included because all schools in this panel 
have electricity.   29 
fourth  grade,  it  also  suggests  that  the  Fundef  led  to  a  reduction  in  the  level  of 
Mathematics  proficiency  by  the  eighth  grade  students  in  public  schools.  Again,  it 
signals a fall in the quality of education.  
From the previous section, we obtained the evidence that there was an increase in 
the repetition rate in the final grades. This result could be explained either by a rise in 
the  educational  standard  or  a  fall  in  the  quality  of  education.  However,  the  first 
explanation should have led to a rise in the students’ proficiency, which does not seem 
to have occurred based on the evidence presented above. Hence, the second explanation 
is more likely to have occurred.  
In conclusion, there is no empirical evidence corroborating the view that the Fundef 
led to an increase in the quality of the education in Brazilian public schools. The results 
obtained above suggest that it is more likely to have occurred a fall in the standard level 
in the initial grades, and a fall in the quality of education in the last grades. 
 
6) Conclusion 
We investigated possible effects associated with the introduction of the Brazilian 
program  called  Fundef.  In  particular,  we  checked  if  one  important  feature  of  this 
program  –  the  fact  that  teachers’  wage  become  indirectly  linked  to  the  number  of 
students enrolled in their schools – affected their behavior. We tested the predictions of 
the model developed in this paper and found empirical evidence supporting them. 
On the one hand, teachers seem to have engaged in opportunistic behavior or 
gaming. They adjusted the fail and repetition rates in order to maximize the number of 
students and, consequently, receive higher wages. The optimal strategy was to reduce 
the fail and repetition rates in the first grades – to avoid students to drop out from school   30 
– and to increase them  in the final  grades – to maintain students longer periods in 
school. The magnitude of this effect was significant. For example, there was a fall of 
almost 12% in the repetition rate in the first grade vis-à-vis the pre-Fundef period. In the 
last grade of the fundamental education, there was a rise of almost 38%. 
On the other hand, the optimal strategy indicated above occurs in the schools 
located in the municipalities with a small number of public schools. However, the same 
pattern is not observed in municipalities with relatively high number of schools. These 
are the results when we take into consideration the combined effects of the Fundef, that 
is, the gaming and free-rider effects. 
The results obtained in this paper are additional evidence that teachers seem to 
respond to incentives. When designing educational programs, policymakers should take 
into  consideration  these  possible  side-effects  and,  if  possible,  adopt  measures  to 
mitigate them.  
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 Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1. 
  Recall the teacher’s maximization problem. 





















E E S E k f E k f N R U
j j 2 1 2 1
;
1 ; 1 2 max
2 1
α α
λ λ  
  Since  the  objective  function  is  concave,  the  first  order  conditions  yield  the 
optimal choice for the teacher.  
  Denote by A the expression  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
α α
λ λ
j j E k f E k f N 2 1 1 2 + + − − −  and by Σ 
the sum ∑
≠ j i
i S . Then, the first order conditions can be written as below. 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j j j E E A R U E k N A R E E A R U 2 1 2
1
1 2 1 1 1 ; 1 1 ; − − Σ + = − ⋅ ⋅ Σ + ′ ⋅ − − Σ +
− α λ α . 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
j j j j E E A R U E k N A R E E A R U 2 1 2
1
2 2 1 1 1 ; 1 ; − − Σ + = ⋅ ⋅ Σ + ′ ⋅ − − Σ +
− α αλ . 
 




α λ E = ( )
1
2
















. Note that, since U is strictly increasing, it must be the case that 
( ) ( ) 0 1 ; 2 1 2 > − − Σ +
j j E E A R U . But then, the first condition above requires that  0 > 1
∗ E  
and the second condition requires that 0 > 2
∗ E . 
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
  Recall the notation Σ=
i
j i S ∑ ≠ . We will determine the effect of a change in Σ on 
the  solution 
∗ ∗
2 1 ,E E .  From  the  previous  proof  of    Proposition  1,  we  can  write   33 
( ) Σ =
∗ E E1 ,  ( ) Σ =














= l .  Let  ( ) Σ A   represent  the  expression 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
α α α λ λ Σ + + Σ − − − E kl f E k f N 1 2 ;  then,  the  first  order  conditions  in 
equilibrium reduce to: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = Σ − ⋅ ⋅ Σ + Σ ′ ⋅ Σ + − Σ + Σ
−1
1 1 1 1 ;
α λ α E k N A R E l A R U
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] Σ + − Σ + Σ E l A R U 1 1 ; 2  
  Suppose Σ increases. We will consider three possible effects on  ( ) Σ E . 
  Suppose, first, that ( ) Σ E  does not change. In that case, the right hand side of the 
first order condition does not change. On the other hand, since R is strictly increasing 
and strictly concave, and since U is strictly concave, the left hand side decreases. But 
this yields a contradiction. Therefore,  ( ) Σ E  has to change. 
  Suppose, second, that ( ) Σ E  increases. In that case  ( ) ( ) Σ + Σ A R  increases. Since 
U21>0 and U22<0 (U is strictly concave), it must be the case that the right hand side of 
the  first  order  condition  increases.  On  the  other  hand,  ( ) ( ) Σ + Σ ′ A R   and  ( )
1 − Σ
α E  
decrease.  Moreover,  since  U12>0  and  U11<0  (U  is  strictly  concave),  then 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] Σ + − Σ + Σ E l A R U 1 1 ; 1  also decreases. Hence, the left hand side of the first order 
condition decreases. But this yields again a contradiction.  
  Therefore, it must be the case that  ( ) Σ E  decreases. Hence, as the number of 
schools in a municipality or state increase, the incentives for teacher to make an effort in 




Table 1: DID – Average Repetition Rate 
   Public  Private  Difference 
1999  0.150  0.036  0.114   34 
1997  0.176  0.048  0.128 
Difference  -0.027  -0.013  -0.014 
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Table 2: DID – Repetition Rate for Grades 1-8 
   Public  Private  Difference  Grade 
1999  0.203  0.029  0.174 
1997  0.237  0.041  0.196 
Difference  -0.034  -0.012  -0.022 
S=1 
1999  0.150  0.024  0.126 
1997  0.165  0.035  0.130 
Difference  -0.016  -0.011  -0.005 
S=2 
1999  0.101  0.026  0.075 
1997  0.117  0.037  0.080 
Difference  -0.016  -0.012  -0.005 
S=3 
1999  0.079  0.024  0.055 
1997  0.084  0.032  0.051 
Difference  -0.004  -0.008  0.004 
S=4 
1999  0.105  0.049  0.057 
1997  0.118  0.071  0.047 
Difference  -0.013  -0.022  0.009 
S=5 
1999  0.091  0.049  0.042 
1997  0.094  0.064  0.030 
Difference  -0.003  -0.016  0.013 
S=6 
1999  0.070  0.045  0.025 
1997  0.070  0.056  0.013 
Difference  0.000  -0.011  0.011 
S=7 
1999  0.054  0.037  0.017 
1997  0.044  0.043  0.001 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
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Table 3: OLS Results Equation (1) – Average and Grades 1-8 (*) (**) 
  Averag
e  G=1  G=2  G=3  G=4  G=5  G=6  G=7  G=8 
-0.0141  -0.0089  -0.0123  -0.0113  -0.0136  -0.0201  -0.0129  -0.0100  -0.0070 
D1999 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0609  0.0840  0.0840  0.0526  0.0409  0.0286  0.0231  0.0126  0.0074 
Dpublic 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0078  -0.0266  -0.0012  -0.0044  0.0082  0.0156  0.0158  0.0132  0.0167 
D1999*Dpublic 
0.000  0.000  0.384  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
School/Students Controls 
1.9E-01  2.1E-01  1.1E-01  7.2E-02  7.4E-02  1.9E-01  1.5E-01  1.3E-01  1.3E-01 
Fail Rate Stock 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0011  -0.0004  -0.0008  -0.0006  0.0000  -0.0013  -0.0010  -0.0008  -0.0009 
Television (Number) 




06  4.5E-06  -1.7E-
06 
-3.1E-
06  4.9E-05  -2.5E-
04 
-2.0E-
04  4.0E-06 
VCR/DVD (Number) 
0.331  0.098  0.309  0.566  0.213  0.775  0.134  0.046  0.980 
0.0107  0.0115  0.0002  0.0032  -0.0003  -0.0066  -0.0025  -0.0006  0.0032 
Computer Lab 
0.000  0.000  0.878  0.001  0.765  0.000  0.016  0.519  0.002 
0.0081  0.0056  0.0021  -0.0010  -0.0021  -0.0017  -0.0028  -0.0006  -0.0008 
Sciences Lab 
0.000  0.000  0.020  0.226  0.018  0.070  0.002  0.509  0.317 
-0.0018  -0.0058  -0.0059  -0.0032  0.0018  0.0041  0.0037  0.0035  0.0042 
Sports Court 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.009  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0020  0.0000  0.0012  0.0002  0.0003  -0.0012  -0.0016  -0.0011  -0.0021 
Recreation Area 
0.000  0.995  0.167  0.784  0.699  0.146  0.048  0.136  0.008 
-0.0082  -0.0140  -0.0129  -0.0057  0.0029  0.0090  0.0047  0.0037  0.0030 
Library 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003 
-0.0180  -0.0216  0.0022  0.0029  -0.0011  0.0086  0.0047  -0.0010  -0.0043 
Electricity 
0.000  0.000  0.069  0.011  0.313  0.021  0.279  0.807  0.330 
-0.0086  -0.0067  -0.0025  -0.0023  -0.0012  0.0090  0.0071  0.0001  -0.0040 
Water 
0.000  0.006  0.176  0.203  0.480  0.031  0.055  0.969  0.356 
0.0023  0.0042  0.0055  0.0072  0.0067  0.0085  0.0020  0.0011  -0.0031 
Food 
0.044  0.049  0.002  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.096  0.325  0.059 
Municipality Controls 
-0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0002  0.0003  0.0003  0.0004 
Number of Teachers 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.396  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 









05  Number of Public 
Schools  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.077  0.000  0.001  0.907  0.000 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  Number of Private 
Schools  0.000  0.000  0.024  0.050  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.2172  -0.2709  -0.1429  -0.1218  -0.1074  0.1339  0.1562  0.1399  0.0753 
HDI 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0221  0.0444  0.0345  0.0091  0.0265  0.0119  -0.0030  -0.0062  0.0081 
Gini 


















10  GDP 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
1.0E-08  -9.6E-
09  1.1E-08  8.1E-09  3.7E-08  3.0E-08  1.8E-08  1.2E-08  1.7E-08 
Population 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Area (A) 
0.002  0.001  0.072  0.919  0.142  0.029  0.159  0.019  0.607 
-0.0155  -0.0331  -0.0089  -0.0038  0.0063  0.0169  0.0168  0.0154  0.0171 
Dlocalization 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  318206  294622  286160  271839  245512  81040  74222  70219  66396   37 
(*) In all regressions, the equations include dummies for each state and a constant. For 
simplicity, we excluded these variables from the table. 





                        TABLE 3A   





RATE   
  (%)  IN 1997 (%)  (1)/(2) 
  (1)  (2)   
AVERAGE  -0.78  17.6  -4.43 
G1  -2.66  23.7  -11.22 
G2  -0.12  16.5  -0.73 
G3  -0.44  11.7  -3.76 
G4  0.82  8.4  9.76 
G5  1.56  11.8  13.22 
G6  1.58  9.4  16.81 
G7  1.32  7  18.86 
G8  1.67  4.4  37.95   38 
Table 4: OLS Results Equation (1’) – Average and Grades 1-8 
  Averag
e  G=1  G=2  G=3  G=4  G=5  G=6  G=7  G=8 
-0.0175  -0.0118  -0.0154  -0.0143  -0.0155  -0.0241  -0.0174  -0.0130  -0.0096 
D1999 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0639  0.0868  0.0870  0.0555  0.0428  0.0316  0.0264  0.0147  0.0092 
Dpublic 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0004  -0.0198  0.0059  0.0026  0.0125  0.0243  0.0259  0.0197  0.0224 
D1999*Dpublic 


















05  D1999*Dpublic*(N) 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
School/Students Controls 
0.1849  0.2052  0.1107  0.0725  0.0739  0.1862  0.1524  0.1336  0.1242 
Fail Rate Stock 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.0012  -0.0005  -0.0009  -0.0007  0.0000  -0.0014  -0.0011  -0.0009  -0.0009 
Television (Number) 




06  4.6E-06  -1.6E-
06 
-3.1E-





05  VCR/DVD (Number) 
0.352  0.111  0.290  0.590  0.218  0.889  0.109  0.037  0.949 
0.0108  0.0114  0.0000  0.0031  -0.0004  -0.0061  -0.0019  -0.0002  0.0035 
Computer Lab 
0.000  0.000  0.987  0.002  0.716  0.000  0.065  0.805  0.001 
0.0079  0.0052  0.0017  -0.0014  -0.0023  -0.0017  -0.0028  -0.0005  -0.0008 
Sciences Lab 
0.000  0.000  0.061  0.094  0.009  0.075  0.002  0.542  0.343 
-0.0017  -0.0057  -0.0057  -0.0030  0.0020  0.0042  0.0038  0.0036  0.0043 
Sports Court 
0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-2.0E-







03  Recreation Area 
0.000  0.979  0.159  0.761  0.685  0.175  0.063  0.167  0.011 
-0.0078  -0.0135  -0.0125  -0.0053  0.0032  0.0091  0.0048  0.0038  0.0031 
Library 




02  1.9E-03  2.6E-03  -1.2E-
03  8.3E-03  4.4E-03  -1.3E-
03 
-4.6E-
03  Electricity 
0.000  0.000  0.109  0.020  0.246  0.026  0.313  0.768  0.304 
-0.0086  -0.0067  -0.0025  -0.0023  -0.0013  0.0087  0.0067  -0.0002  -0.0042 
Water 
0.000  0.005  0.169  0.196  0.467  0.037  0.074  0.963  0.328 
0.0016  0.0034  0.0046  0.0064  0.0061  0.0070  0.0002  0.0000  -0.0041 
Food 







04  1.9E-05  1.7E-04  1.9E-04  2.6E-04  3.3E-04  4.4E-04 
Number of Teachers 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.274  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 





05  1.1E-05  -2.7E-
05  Number of Public Schools 
(N)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.599  0.001  0.203  0.233  0.003 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Number of Private Schools 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
-0.2239  -0.2759  -0.1483  -0.1273  -0.1112  0.1235  0.1440  0.1319  0.0681 
HDI 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0212  0.0436  0.0336  0.0081  0.0258  0.0113  -0.0035  -0.0065  0.0078 
Gini 


















09  GDP 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
2.6E-08  3.8E-09  2.5E-08  2.2E-08  4.6E-08  4.7E-08  3.7E-08  2.4E-08  2.7E-08 
Population 
0.000  0.105  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Area (A) 
0.003  0.001  0.093  0.826  0.170  0.011  0.074  0.009  0.462 
Dlocalization  -0.0154  -0.0329  -0.0087  -0.0036  0.0064  0.0171  0.0170  0.0156  0.0173   39 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Observations  318206  294622  286160  271839  245512  81040  74222  70219  66396 
 
Figure 3: DID – Average and Grades 1-8, N=10 Schools 
 
 
Figure 4: DID – Average and Grades 1-8, N=1000 Schools 
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Table 7: OLS Results Equation (1’) – Average and Grades 4th and 8th 
4th year  8th year 
  Unbalanced  Balanced    Unbalanced  Balanced 
4.7630  8.5407  -6.1869  -1.5700 
D2001 
0.000  0.015 
D2005 
0.000  0.763 
-16.7466  -17.6638  1.8038  13.9907 
Dpublic 
0.000  0.041 
Dpublic 
0.508  0.317 
-8.4527  -10.6191  -5.2951  -17.0311 
D2001*Dpublic 
0.000  0.013 
D2005*Dpublic 
0.002  0.0030 
Students Controls  Students Controls 
-4.6161  -11.6825  7.2576  21.0084 
Men 
0.024  0.259 
Men 
0.017  0.070 
3.8258  11.2983  16.4065  2.4353 
White 
0.034  0.244 
White 
0.000  0.838 
7.5262  1.7053  8.0401  7.1758 
Father's education 
0.000  0.674 
Father's education 
0.000  0.284 
8.8561  14.5321  13.7558  6.4454 
Mother's education 
0.000  0.000 
Mother's education 
0.000  0.248 
-0.9862  -0.7976  13.6065  18.8509 
Previous private school 
0.448  0.895 
Previous private school 
0.000  0.043 
16.9084  18.7950  25.7560  29.2164 
Failed 
0.000  0.011 
Failed 
0.000  0.000 
Teachers Controls  Teachers Controls 
-0.6732  2.3641  -1.0045  -1.8681 
Men 
0.530  0.509 
Men 
0.409  0.635 
-0.1443  1.4093  2.7839  7.9472 
Education level 
0.633  0.355 
Education level 
0.079  0.058 
0.8693  -1.2438  1.1033  -1.4907 
Experience 
0.311  0.748 
Experience 
0.354  0.774 
3.4028  0.2597  1.9467  3.4371 
Wage 
0.000  0.859 
Wage 
0.004  0.208 
Schools Controls  Schools Controls 
6.2796  7.5569  -  - 
Localization 
0.000  0.1640 
Localization 
-  - 
-4.3761  -8.0962  10.2786  11.5209 
Water 
0.028  0.3150 
Water 
0.111  0.2020 
-0.2834  -5.3236  -23.6435  - 
Electricity 
0.924  0.3340 
Electricity 
0.008  - 
0.7014  2.3812  1.2888  3.0801 
Library 
0.283  0.3100 
Library 
0.229  0.3730 
0.7417  1.0270  2.2636  -2.5040 
Television 
0.676  0.8680 
Television 
0.412  0.6190 
0.5820  2.1806  2.1315  1.4751 
VCR/DVD 
0.712  0.6490 
VCR/DVD 
0.214  0.8010 
Observations  4994  270  Observations  2595  165 
 
 